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Since June, the “closed ports” policy of the new Italian government has repeatedly
raised tensions with Europe and with the law. Soon after the conclusion of a second
Aquarius case, closed with the landing in Malta of the 141 migrants saved by an
NGO ship and the agreement to distribute them in five Member States (France,
Spain, Germany, Portugal and Luxembourg), another contentious case erupted. In
the night between 15 and 16 August, two patrol vessels of the Italian Coast Guard
rescued 190 migrants in the Maltese SAR area and transferred them on the Diciotti,
an Italian military ship. The Italian government has already made clear that its ports
are closed to any ONG ships. But what if the migrants are rescued by an Italian ship
operating under the EU’s Sophia mission?
In July, a similar dispute, again involving the Diciotti, ended up with the intervention
of the President of the Republic Mattarella, who persuaded the Prime Minister Conte
to open the port of Trapani and disembark the 67 migrants rescued four days before.
This time, however, the Interior Minister Salvini, leader of the far-right League party,
immediately declared that he would not accept any interference from the President
of the Republic, and threatened to bring the migrants back to Libya if other Member
State would not share the burden.
As a result, 177 migrants remained stranded on the Diciotti for seven to ten days.
After five days spent in stand-by off Lampedusa, the Minister of Infrastructures and
Transport Toninelli, on which the Italian Coast Guard depends, allowed the ship
to dock in the port of Catania. Mr Salvini, though, promptly announced that no one
could land until the EU found a solution. Two days later the disembarkation ban was
lifted for 27 unaccompanied minors, whereas 150 migrants had to wait three more
days. On 25 August – after a failed attempt of the Commission to promote another
voluntary distribution of incoming migrants – the Italian government authorized the
disembarkation and announced that 100 migrants would be hosted (on Italian soil)
by the Catholic Church, 20 by Ireland and 20 by Albania, a non-EU State. Can this
be considered a happy ending?
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The (misleading) criminal investigation
“Any limitation of personal freedom must come to terms with the rules and
regulations of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Constitution, the
Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. You cannot escape”. With these
words, on 25 August, the Prosecutor of Agrigento registered Mr Salvini and the
head of his ministerial cabinet as suspects for three alleged offenses: kidnapping,
illegal arrest and abuse of office. Few days later, two offences were added to the
list: kidnapping for the purpose of compulsion, as Mr Salvini would have prevented
the landing to obtain from the EU the redistribution of migrants; and the omission
of official acts, since the Ministry indicated the port of Catania only for a “technical
stopover”, thus neglecting the Coast Guard’s request for a safe haven.
Whatever the merit of these allegations, which would imply a cumulative period of
30 years of incarceration, there is little chance that it will be ever examined before
a criminal court. Ministers, in fact, can be subjected to ordinary jurisdiction for
crimes committed in the exercise of their functions only if two conditions, set by
constitutional provisions, are satisfied: that a special court, composed of six judges
chosen by drawing lots, does not dismiss the case for the inconsistency of the
charges; and that the competent parliamentary chamber gives the authorization to
proceed.
In the meantime, the launch of this bold investigation has already produced two
results. First, it offered Mr Salvini a unmissable opportunity to stand up as a
martyr in his Hobbesian struggle to defend the Italian borders: in his words, the
prosecutor’s charges are “medals”. Second, it reopened, after the golden times of
Silvio Berlusconi, a new chapter in the conflict between politics and the judiciary. At
least this confirms that the Italian judiciary remains “fiercely independent”, as Max
guessed in his editorial on the Festa della Repubblica.
The (real) legal problems
For a non-partisan legal scholar, the interest of the Diciotti case lies elsewhere. The
personal liberty of 177 migrants has been confined for much longer than the time
needed to complete the rescue operation. Therefore, the first question is whether
the 10-day period of detention onboard inflicted upon the migrants is compatible with
the guarantees provided by Article 5 EHCR and Article 13 of the Italian Constitution,
which both require that any measure of administrative detention must be carried out
in accordance with the law and be promptly reviewed by a judicial authority. The
patent deficiencies of the conduct of the Italian Government in these respects make
a condemnation before the Court of Strasbourg very plausible, in line with the ruling
in the Khlaifia case, discussed also here.
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A second problem concerns the possible transfer of 20 rescued migrants to Albania,
announced soon after the disembarkation in Catania. The Dublin III Regulation (No.
604/2013) sets the conditions and procedure under which an asylum applicant can
be transferred to another Member State designated as responsible for processing
the request. By contrast, the transfer to a non-EU country like Albania is not
regulated by any norm of European or international law. A series of questions
thus arise: How are the migrants to be transferred to Albania selected? What if the
rescued migrants – mostly from Eritrea – want to apply for international protection
in Italy: Can they be relocated in Albania without their consent? How can they
challenge the transfer decision? What happens to them after their arrival? How are
asylum seekers treated in Albania? Is the transfer possible even if there is no court
or procedure to ascertain whether “there are substantial grounds for believing that
there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for
applicants” in the non-EU State of destination – in which case Article 3 of the Dublin
III regulation prevents the transfer (also) to a EU Member State?
A third issue can be related to the Interior Minister’s threat of bringing migrants back
to Libya if the European partners refused to share the burden. Had such words been
followed by facts, the Italian push-back operation would have openly violated the
non-refoulement principle, as in the Hirsi case. But another legal question would
send a truly alarming message to Rome and the other European chancelleries.
For how long the delegation of search and rescue (i.e. push-back) operations to
the Libyan Coast Guard – in a Central Mediterranean now emptied by NGO ships
and with the Sophia mission in likely retreat – will be sufficient to shield the Italian
government from legal responsibility for aiding and assisting the former (see here,
here and here)? Given the expanding notion of State jurisdiction (and responsibility)
under international law, the European strategy of border externalization might
become legally vulnerable.
Beyond the populist contradiction
The Diciotti case also illustrates the conundrum that Lega and Movimento Cinque
Stelle are facing. For an anti-system government, both the unauthorized migrants
and a divided Union are perfect targets to feed its consensus. Yet, geography
suggests that Italy must cooperate with the rest of Europe in order to manage
immigration from Africa, as Italy’s stay in the Schengen club is at stake. For populist
movements, to recognize that the need for protection of their electorate can only be
satisfied within Europe is an encounter with reality that takes time to digest. In the
meantime, the mismatch between the instinctive need for a daily plebiscite, based
on anti-Europeanism, and the more rational necessity of a long-term strategy, based
on European solidarity, explains the government’s reluctant nationalism and the
ambiguities of a negotiating style that evokes the image of a begging emperor.
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However, this superficial contradiction should not hide the deeper one, which
threatens the future of the European migration and asylum policy. Except for the
Višegrad countries, all European partners declare themselves to be in favor of
the principle of solidarity in the management of immigration. But the meaning that
the parties attribute to the concept of solidarity is different. Macron and now also
Merkel would like the burden-sharing to be essentially financial: The other European
partners will provide Italy with the necessary resources, as they already do with
Turkey, but Italy will still have to manage the migratory flows arriving from the sea,
possibly through the creation of "controlled centers", as the conclusions of the
European Council of last June suggest (here, at § 6).
The Italian position is understandably different. After years in which Italy has been
the only European country to take seriously the legal obligation to save migrants in
the Mediterranean and to accept them on its territory, the Italian government calls
for a broader notion of “burden sharing” which involves also a distribution of people
and, hence, it proposes to cut off the link between the country of first entry and the
obligation to process asylum applications on which the Dublin system relies. At a
time when Germany is trying to make the “first country of entry” rule really binding,
the Italian position can be hardly dismissed as unreasonable. But there is a serious
risk that the current strategy of blackmailing Europe, reiterated in the Diciotti case,
will end up compromising the solidity of Italian arguments and eroding the already
narrow margins for negotiation in Brussels.
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